Articulos y Libros sobre la Gran Depresion de los 1930's

Former President Harry S Truman is credited with explaining the difference between an economic recession and a depression.

"It's a recession when your neighbor loses his job; it's a depression when you lose yours," Truman was quoted as saying in an April 13, 1958, article in the Observer magazine.

As unemployment and credit crises continue to rock the national economy, The Sun interviewed veterans of the worst economic downturn in U.S. history, The Great Depression - lessons from which continue to have relevance today.

Over the past eight months, several people who were children or young adults during the Depression era of 1929 to 1940 have recalled for The Sun how their families survived during that financially devastating era. Most recalled living by a simple axiom of getting down to the basics of family and focusing on their needs rather than wants.

II?

May 02, 2009

Phill Tomlinson writes: A great deal can be learnt through history. In a practical sense its completely useless, as it merely just documents past events, but past events can help explain current and possible future events. If you can never get to grips with a subject matter it is best to look at history to try and to identify possible similarities. I have taken some quotes from a historical book and I think a lot of the quotes below could be said of the current situation we find ourselves in.

"If the Federal Reserve had an inflationist attitude during the boom, it was just as ready to try to cure the depression by inflating further. It stepped in immediately to expand credit and bolster shaky financial positions. In an act unprecedented in its history, the Federal Reserve moved in during the week of the crash—the final week of October—and in that brief period added almost $300 million to the reserves of the nation’s banks. During that week, the Federal Reserve doubled its holdings of government securities, adding over $150 million to reserves, and it discounted about $200 million more for member banks. Instead of going through a healthy and rapid liquidation of unsound positions, the economy was fated to be continually bolstered by governmental measures that could only prolong its diseased state."

"The Federal Reserve also promptly and sharply lowered its rediscount rate, from 6 percent at the beginning of the crash to 4.5 percent by mid-November. Acceptance rates were also reduced considerably. This enormous expansion was generated to prevent liquidation on the stock market and to permit the New York City banks to take over the brokers’ loans that the “other,” non-bank, lenders were liquidating."

"Dr. Anderson records that, at the end of December, 1929, the leading Federal Reserve officials wanted to pursue a laissez-faire policy: “the disposition was to let the money market ‘sweat it out’ and reach monetary ease by the wholesome process of liquidation.” The Federal Reserve was prepared to let the money market find its own level, without providing artificial stimuli that could only prolong the crisis. But early in 1930, the government instituted a massive easy money program. Rediscount rates of the New York Fed fell from 4.5 percent in February to 2 percent by the end of the year."

"During 1930, the Federal Reserve had steadily lowered its rediscount rates: from 4.2 percent at the beginning of the year, to 2 percent at the end, and finally down to 1.2 percent in mid-1931."

"President Hoover was proud of his experiment in cheap money, and in his speech to the business conference on December 5, he hailed the nation’s good fortune in possessing the splendid Federal Reserve System, which had succeeded in saving shaky banks, had restored confidence, and had made capital more abundant by reducing interest rates. Hoover had done his part to spur the expansion by personally urging the banks to rediscount more extensively at the Federal Reserve Banks. Secretary Mellon issued one of his by now traditionally optimistic pronouncements that there was “plenty of credit available.” And William Green issued a series of optimistic statements, commending the Federal Reserve’s success in ending the depression. On November 22, Green said: All the factors which make for a quick and speedy industrial and economic recovery are present and evident. The Federal Reserve System is operating, serving as a barrier against financial demoralization. Within a few months industrial conditions will become normal, confidence and stabilization in industry and finance will be restored."

"By early 1930, people were generally convinced that there was little to worry about. Hoover’s decisive actions on so many fronts—wages, construction, public works, farm supports, etc., indicated to the public that this time swift national planning would turn the tide quickly. Farm prices then seemed to be recovering, and unemployment had not yet reached catastrophic proportions, averaging less than 9 percent of the labor force in 1930."

"During the second half of 1930, production, prices, foreign trade, and employment continued to decline. On July 29, Hoover called for an investigation of bankruptcy laws in order to weaken them and prevent many bankruptcies—thus turning to the ancient device of attempting to revive confidence by injuring creditors and propping up unsound positions."

"As a consequence, while the immigration law had already reduced net immigration into the United States to about 200,000 per year, Hoover’s decree reduced net immigration to 35,000 in 1931, and in 1932 there was a net emigration of 77,000. In addition, Hoover’s Emergency Committee on Employment organized concerted propaganda to urge young people to return to school in the fall, and thus leave the labor market."

"He hailed the Federal Reserve System as the great instrument of promoting stability, and called for an “ample supply of credit at low rates of interest,” as well as public works, as the best methods of ending the depression."

"As 1931 drew to a close and another Congressional session drew near, the country and indeed the world were in the midst of an authentic crisis atmosphere—a crisis of policy and of ideology. The depression, so long in effect, was now rapidly growing worse, in America and throughout the world. The stage was set for the “Hoover New Deal” of 1932."

"During 1929, the Federal government had a huge surplus of $1.2 billion"

"From a modest surplus in 1930, the Federal government thus ran up a huge $2.2 billion deficit in 1931."

"One thing Hoover was not reticent about: launching a huge inflationist program. First, the administration cleared the path for the program by passing the Glass–Steagall Act in February, which (a) greatly broadened the assets eligible for rediscounts with the Fed, and (b) permitted the Federal Reserve to use government bonds as collateral for its notes, in addition to commercial paper"

"Thus, the Hoover administration pursued a giant inflationary policy from March through July 1932, raising controlled reserves by $1 billion through Fed purchase of government securities. If all other factors had remained constant, and banks fully loaned up, the money supply would have risen abruptly and wildly by over $10 billion during that period. Instead, and fortunately, the inflationary policy was reversed and turned into a rout. What defeated it? Foreigners who lost confidence in the dollar, partly as a result of the program, and drew out gold; American citizens who lost confidence in the banks and changed their deposits into Federal Reserve notes; and finally, bankers who refused to endanger themselves any further, and either used the increased resources to repay debt to the Federal Reserve or allowed them to pile up in the vaults. And so, fortunately, inflation by the government was turned into deflation by the policies of the public and the banks, and the money supply dropped by $3.5 billion."

Notice some parallels between the present and the period being described above? The things I find most striking are the fact the FED drastically cut rates from 6% to 1.2%, compared with today in which they cut from 5.25% to 2% at present. Also the fact that at the beginning of the bust the government were running huge budget surpluses, and within a couple of years were running huge deficits, compared with now where the US has persistently for years now been running up huge deficits which will get worse.

Of course the period being described was the Great Depression and the Quotes were taken from Murray Rothbards book, Americas Great Depression. Contrary to what people believe the great depression was not suddenly brought about after the infamous stock market crash in October 1929, it was brought about over a 3-4 year period of excessive monetary inflation in the previous years during the 1920's boom and increasing inflationary policies during the bust along with increased government interference, which made the Depression so great. In fact the stock market also rallied during this time and didn't bottom out till around 1933. Hoover was the creator of the New Deal, Roosevelt just merely carried on with it with even more enthusiasm contary to the myth that Hoover had a no hands approach to the economy. In the end this is where we now stand,

"But here, in the crisis of 1933, the banks could no longer continue as they were. Something had to be done. Essentially, there were two possible routes. One was the course taken by Roosevelt; the destruction of the property rights of bank depositors, the confiscation of gold, the taking away of the people’s monetary rights, and the placing of the Federal Government in control of a vast, managed, engine of inflation. The other route would have been to seize the opportunity to awaken the American people to the true nature of their banking system, and thereby return, at one swoop, to a truly hard and sound money."

We all know what happened in subsequent years. Nixon removed the US from the gold standard, and in effect all western currencies from gold as bretton woods was dissmantled. Now the dollar and world currencies are backed with nothing as we enter another dissasturous chapter in history of fiat currency.

If we wish to draw the parallels to today, roughly in 1928 real estate prices began to fall compared with 2006 in the US. 1929 and stock prices began to fall, compared with 2007 when the Dow was at its all time high. So what does that mean in the next few years if we are only at 1930. Well we have a lot further to go and the governments and Central Banks are doing exactly what history has taught us not to do.

However there are differences, which I believe position the US in a worse position. Back then the US had huge budget surpluses in previous years, exported goods throughout the world and had huge oil reserves (cheep energy reserves which can never be overstated). They also theoretically had the dollar backed by Gold which meant even though the FED tried to inflate they were constrained, where as now it is a complete fiat currency meaning there will be no limits to inflate this time. Ben Bernanke the current head of the FED is supposedly a student of the Great Depression but from what I've seen, he's repeating what was done 75 years ago, and he's doing a pretty good job of fooling everyone. Nationalising Fannie and Freddie Mac, that were created at the end of the Great Depression, is an absolute disaster as I have said before, and is exactly what President Hoover and the FED would have done during the last depression.

I will end on the following note from Murray Rothbard. Maybe we are facing another depression and crisis of the same magnitude? Or worse?

"What was the trouble? Economic theory demonstrates that only governmental inflation can generate a boom-and-bust cycle, and that the depression will be prolonged and aggravated by inflationist and other interventionary measures. In contrast to the myth of laissez-faire, we have shown in this book how government intervention generated the unsound boom of the 1920s, and how Hoover’s new departure aggravated the Great Depression by massive measures of interference. The guilt for the Great Depression must, at long last, be lifted from the shoulders of the free-market economy, and placed where it properly belongs: at the doors of politicians, bureaucrats, and the mass of “enlightened” economists. And in any other depression, past or future, the story will be the same."

By Phill Tomlinson

The Age of Stupidity "There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as a result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion, or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency system involved.", Ludwig Von Mises

Credit is the lifeblood of an economy. But too much of a good thing can lead to excess and disaster. That's the lesson you'll draw from Steven Gjerstad and Vernon L. Smith's excellent piece in yesterday's Wall Street Journal.

Gierstad and Smith want to know why some asset bubbles (i.e., tech stocks) pop without bringing broader economic collapse, while others (i.e, real estate) do. Their provisional answer:

In the equities-market downturn early in this decade, declining assets were held by institutional and individual investors that either owned the assets outright, or held only a small fraction on margin, so losses were absorbed by their owners. In the current crisis, declining housing assets were often, in effect, purchased between 90% and 100% on margin. In some of the cities hit hardest, borrowers who purchased in the low-price tier at the peak of the bubble have seen their home value decline 50% or more. Over the past 18 months as housing prices have fallen, millions of homes became worth less than the loans on them, huge losses have been transmitted to lending institutions, investment banks, investors in mortgage-backed securities, sellers of credit default swaps, and the insurer of last resort, the U.S. Treasury.

In an important paper in 1983, Ben Bernanke argued that during the Depression, severe damage to the financial system impeded its ability to perform its economic role of lending to households for durable goods consumption and to firms for production and trade. We are seeing this process playing out now as loan funds for automobile purchases have withered. Auto sales fell 41% between February 2008 and February 2009. Retail and labor markets too are now part of the collateral damage from the housing debacle. Housing peaked in early 2006. Losses from the mortgage market began to infect the financial system in 2006; asset prices in that sector began to decline at the end of 2006. Meanwhile, equities and the broader economy were performing well, but as the financial sector deteriorated, its problems blindsided the rest of the economy.

Consumer and institutional indebtedness, in other words, were the means by which losses in the real estate sector were transmitted throughout the economy. And something similar happened 80 years ago:

The events of the past 10 years have an eerie similarity to the period leading up to the Great Depression. Total mortgage debt outstanding increased from $9.35 billion in 1920 to $29.44 billion in 1929. In 1920, residential mortgage debt was 10.2% of household wealth; by 1929, it was 27.2% of household wealth.

The Great Depression has been attributed to excessive speculation on Wall Street, especially between the spring of 1927 and the fall of 1929. Had the difficulties of the banking system been caused by losses on brokers' loans for margin purchases in 1929, the results should have been felt in the banks immediately after the stock market crash. But the banking system did not show serious strains until the fall of 1930.

Bank earnings reached a record $729 million in 1929. Yet bank exposures to real estate were substantial; as the decline in real estate prices accelerated, foreclosures wiped out banks by the thousands.

The difference between now and then is that the Depression-era Federal Reserve contracted the money supply, whereas the Obama-era Fed has greatly expanded it. Gjerstad and Smith appear skeptical that increases in the money supply, or "quantitative easing," will be enough to stop the contraction. America spent the last 20 years piling up debt - personal, commercial, public - and the bill has come due. Nothing changes that fact. The Great Deleveraging has begun.

The Crash of 2008: It's the Panic of 1825 all over again (also 1837, 1847, 1866 ... )

A freeze in lending triggers a panic in a Western financial capital which then spreads around the globe, eventually tipping several South American countries into default. In a desperate attempt to stem the panic, the central bank steps in as "the lender of last resort" and unleashes a flood of new money into the palpitating financial system.

Gee, was that 1998, or 2008? Neither -- try 1825 London.

You might think an era of gas lighting, slow sailing ships and horse-drawn carriages has little to teach us about modern finance, but much of what we consider advanced capitalism has been in place since the 1500s: stock markets, portfolio insurance, options, commercial paper and global banking.

Eerily, many of the conditions that fed the boom of the 1820s and the bust of 1825 parallel the present:

Emerging economies were opening (South America then, China and India now);
Expansionary monetary policy and easy credit fueled a stock market boom;
Infrastructure projects required massive capital and equally massive borrowing;
Risky/fraudulent "investments" were sold alongside sound ventures;
Banks' lending discipline and oversight declined in the euphoria, creating bad debt;
Prices rose, adding to the instability (in our era: oil jumping to $147 a barrel);
Speculation in overseas and risky domestic ventures ran rampant;
New financial instruments had been introduced which obscured both risks and returns.
The academic phrase for this gulf between what the seller of the security or property knows -- that it is hugely risky -- and what the buyer accepts as true -- that this is a "safe" investment with a satisfactorily high return -- is "asymmetric information."

Many analysts point to the prodigious expansion of difficult-to-assess mortgage backed securities and exotic derivatives such as CDOs (collateralized debt obligations, often backed by highly leveraged securities) as the chief source of asymmetric information flow which caused buyers around the world to purchase highly risky assets in the belief that they were high-yielding "safe" investments.

Others point to the ample opportunities for fraud and embezzlement in such cloudy situations -- another parallel with 1825 and indeed, every stock market/credit bubble and subsequent crash.

It is generally overlooked that capitalism in its natural state is highly prone to bouts of credit expansion and euphoric speculation which then lead to financial panics and crashes. The Panic of 1825, for instance, was followed by the panics of 1837, 1847 and 1857. Then next crash, in 1866, was hardly the end of volatility, as the Panic of 1873 was a real doozy, setting off a deep six-year recession in the U.S. The Panic of 1893 is generally considered to have launched a depression, while the Panic of 1907 is widely credited with sparking the creation of the Federal Reserve system six years later in 1913.

Walter Bagehot, the influential editor of The Economist in the 1860s and 70s, held the view that the first task of a central bank during a financial panic is to end the panic. In 1825, after some initial hesitancy, the Bank of England did exactly that by lending money to anyone with just about any sort of collateral -- not just sound assets but even illiquid assets.

This flood of new lending staunched the panic, but the stock market slump and recession lasted into 1826.

Central banks appear to have taken Bagehot's message to heart, as the Federal Reserve and other central banks have slashed interest rates to near-zero and eased lending to banks and financial institutions. The Fed has also taken distressed assets such as mortgage-backed securities as collateral.

The central purpose of the U.S. Treasury and the Fed's interventions has been to prop up the banking system, with the understanding that it was necessary because banks perform the essential services of processing private information (mortgage applications, for example) and monitoring borrowers.

But what the Fed and Treasury have not learned from the Panic of 1825 is that the shareholders and managers of the banks which were saved from insolvency by central bank intervention should suffer the losses which are necessary to encourage prudent lending after the panic has ended.

The Fed and indeed, all the central banks of the major global economies, also failed to understand the chief lesson of the 1825 Panic: that it was fundamentally fueled by expansionist monetary policy.

Thus we have to wonder if the current central banking "solution" -- encouraging lending, lowering interest rates and accepting any sort of distressed asset as collateral -- isn't just setting up the Panic of 2011.

Whenever you find you are on the side of the majority, it is time to pause and reflect

--- Mark Twain

We have never observed a great civilization with a population as old as the United States will have in the twenty-first century; we have never observed a great civilization that is as secular as we are apparently going to become; and we have had only half a century of experience with advanced welfare states...Charles Murray

Kella

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Former President Harry S Truman is credited with explaining the difference between an economic recession and a depression.

Lessons From the Great

Depression, Next Great Depression

II?

How Bullion Lost Its Luster

Compare This Crisis To Anything But The Great Depression: Comparison of the 1930's Economic Structure

Debt and Depression

The Crash of 2008: It's the Panic of 1825 all over again (also 1837, 1847, 1866 ... )